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Abstract 
This article focuses on the legal issues arising under Directive 2011/24/EU on the application 
of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare. This Directive aims to facilitate the access to 
safe and high-quality cross-border healthcare and promotes cooperation on healthcare 
between Member States. The present article first examines how general EU free movement 
law regulates healthcare services and, in particular, medical services provided within the 
framework of social security systems. It then analyses the provisions of Directive 
2011/24/EU regarding the systems of prior authorisation and reimbursement of cross-border 
healthcare and compares them with the existing framework on the coordination of social 
security systems and the relevant case law of the European Court of Justice.  
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I. Introduction 
 
“Today is an important day for patients across the European Union. As of today, EU law in 
force enshrines citizens' right to go to another EU country for treatment and get reimbursed 
for it. From today, all EU countries should have transposed the Directive on Patients' rights 
in Cross-border Healthcare, adopted 30 months ago, into their National law. For patients, 
this Directive means empowerment: greater choice of healthcare, more information, easier 
recognition of prescriptions across-borders. The Directive is also good news for Europe's 
health systems, improving cooperation between Member States on interoperable eHealth 
tools, the use of health technology assessment, and the pooling of rare expertise […]”.1  
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This statement was made on the 25
th
 of October 2013 by the Health Commissioner, 
Tonio Borg, on the entry into force of the Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients' rights in cross-border 
healthcare (hereinafter “Directive 2011/24/EU” or “Directive” or “Patients’ Mobility 
Directive”).2 This Directive was adopted with the aim to facilitate access to safe and high-
quality cross-border healthcare, to ensure patient’s mobility and to promote cooperation on 
healthcare between Member States. Although the demand for cross-border healthcare 
represents only around 1% of public spending on healthcare, including cases of non-planned 
healthcare such as emergency care for tourists,
3
 this secondary legislation constitutes an 
important step towards the harmonisation of national rules in the relevant field, which have 
so far been significantly divergent, thereby causing difficulties in their application, confusion 
and legal uncertainty. The present article focuses on the convergence achieved by the 
Directive at issue in the field of cross-border healthcare. On the one hand, this convergence 
was much desired by the Commission in view of the important discrepancies of the national 
legislations. On the other hand, the Member States seemed reluctant to sacrifice their welfare 
structures for the accomplishment of the Internal Market. Nevertheless, a compromise was 
finally achieved.  In order to better describe this compromise, the article first examines how 
healthcare services are regulated under the general EU free movement law (II) and it then 
analyses the provisions of Directive 2011/24/EU with emphasis on the issues of prior 
authorisation and reimbursement of cross-border healthcare (III). 
 
II. Healthcare services under EU free movement law 
 
Although the organisation of national health policies remains an exclusive 
competence of the Member States due to their special and sometimes sensitive nature, the 
operation of such policies may be subject to Treaty provisions on the Internal Market and 
competition. In this respect, it should be noted that the EU has a shared competence in the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
University of Warsaw Journal of Comparative Law. May this be the first of many issues to come and 
may they provide a future basis for the evolution of constructive legal thinking. 
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2
 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the 
application of patients' rights in cross-border healthcare [2011] OJ L 88/45. 
3
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area of “common safety concerns in public health matters” under Article 4 (2) (k) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter “TFEU”)4 and a supporting, 
coordinating or complementary competence in the area of “protection and improvement of 
human health” under Article 6 (a) TFEU. This double nature of the EU competence on public 
health issues is reflected in the legal basis provision of Article 168 TFEU, which first sets out 
the general EU objective to ensure a higher level of human health protection and then 
provides for three different types of measures that can be adopted in this respect.
5
 
Furthermore, Article 9 TFEU, the so-called “horizontal” social clause,6 stipulates that all EU 
policies must take into account social requirements “linked to the promotion of a high level 
of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, 
and a high level of education, training and protection of human health”. In addition, it must 
be stated that Article 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights protects “the right of access to 
preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions 
established by national laws and practices”.7 
In this chapter, we will first examine the application of the Treaty provision on the 
Internal Market and in particular on the freedom to provide services to healthcare services 
(A) and we will then proceed with a brief comment on the current system of coordination of 
social security (B).  
 
 
                                                        
4
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47. 
5
 First, Article 168 (2) TFEU provides for the method of coordination through which the EU can 
encourage and support cooperation between the Member States in the area of public health. Second, 
according to Article 168 (4) TFEU, the EU, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, may adopt (a) measures setting high standards of quality and safety for organs and 
substances of human origins, (b) measures in the veterinary and phytosanitary fields and (c) measures 
setting high standards of quality and safety for medicinal products and devices for medical use. 
Finally, according to Article 168 (5), the EU, acting again in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, may adopt incentive measures – excluding any harmonisation - designed to protect and 
improve human health and in particular to combat the major cross-border health scourges, measures 
concerning monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health, and 
measures which have as their direct objective the protection of public health regarding tobacco and 
the abuse of alcohol. 
6
 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Strengthening EU cohesion and EU 
social policy coordination through the new horizontal social clause in Article 9 TFEU’ (own-initiative 
opinion) [2012] OJ C 24/29. 
7
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/391. 
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A. The application of the freedom to provide services to healthcare services 
 
Healthcare services fall within the scope of application of Article 56 TFEU on the 
freedom to provide services. In Luisi and Carbone, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter 
“ECJ” or “Court”) confirmed that Article 56 TFEU covers both the providers and the 
recipients of services and that “persons receiving medical treatment […] are to be regarded 
as recipients of services”.8 This ruling was reaffirmed in the Grogan case, where the ECJ 
held that “medical termination of pregnancy, performed in accordance with the law of the 
State in which it is carried out, constitutes a service within the meaning of Article 60 of the 
Treaty (Article 56 TFEU)”.9  The reasoning of the Court was that services are normally 
provided for remuneration and, in accordance with Article 57 TFEU, they fall under the 
scope of the provisions on the free movement of services in so far as they are not governed 
by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital or persons.
10
 This 
residual character of Article 56 TFEU means that the notion of “services” covers situations 
which are not governed by other freedoms in order to ensure that all economic activity falls 
within the scope of the fundamental freedoms.
11
 Since the “termination of pregnancy, as 
lawfully practised in several Member States, is a medical activity which is normally provided 
for remuneration and may be carried out as part of a professional activity”,12 it is to be 
considered a “service” falling under the scope of Article 56 TFEU whatever the objections on 
the moral plane.
13
 Consequently, the decisive criterion, which determines whether medical 
activities are “services” for the purposes of Article 56 TFEU, is their economic nature.  
The Court has repeatedly held that medical services supplied for consideration fall 
within the scope of the provisions on the freedom to provide services and it has clarified, in 
Smits and Peerbooms, that there is no need to distinguish between care provided in a hospital 
                                                        
8
 Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Graziana Luisi and Giuseppe Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro 
[1984] ECR 00377, para 16. 
9
 Case C-159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Stephen Grogan and 
others [1991] ECR I-04685, para 21.  
10
 Ibid para 17. 
11
 Case C-452/04 Fidium Finanz AG v Bundesanstalt Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht [2006] ECR I-
09521, para 32. 
12
 Case C-159/90 Grogan (n 9) para 18. 
13
 Ibid para 20. 
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environment and care provided outside such an environment,
14
 and in Stamatelaki, that it is 
immaterial whether the establishment in question is public or private.
15
 It has further 
underlined that Article 56 TFEU “does not require that the service be paid for by those for 
whom it is performed”16 and that “the payments made by the sickness insurance funds under 
the contractual arrangements […], albeit set at a flat rate, [are] the consideration for the 
hospital services and unquestionably [represent] remuneration for the hospital which 
receives them and which is engaged in an activity of an economic character”.17  
Subsequently, in Watts, a landmark decision regarding the UK’s National Health 
Service (NHS), the ECJ ruled that Article 56 TFEU applies where a patient “receives medical 
services in a hospital environment for consideration in a Member State other than her State 
of residence, regardless of the way in which the national system with which that person is 
registered and from which reimbursement of the cost of those services is subsequently sought 
operates”.18 However, regarding the highly controversial issue of the economic nature of the 
medical services provided by a NHS, the ECJ, whilst accepting the applicability of Article 56 
TFEU, it nonetheless added that there was “no need in the present case to determine whether 
the provision of hospital treatment in the context of a national health service such as the NHS 
is in itself a service within the meaning of those provisions”.19 In other words, the Court 
seemed deliberately hesitant to rule on whether the services provided by a NHS per se are 
regarded as “services” for the purposes of Article 56 TFEU. 20  The aforementioned 
developments show that although the sector of public health – contrary to the sector of public 
education
21
 – has progressively been subjected to the rules of the Internal Market on the 
                                                        
14
 Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v 
Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-05473, para 53. 
15
 Case C-444/05 Aikaterini Stamatelaki v NPDD Organismos Asfaliseos Eleftheron Epangelmation 
(OAEE) [2007] ECR I-03185, para 22. 
16
 Case C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms (n 14) para 57. 
17
 Ibid para 58. 
18
 Case C-372/04 Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for Health 
[2006] ECR I-04325, para 90. 
19
 Ibid para 91. 
20
 Baeten R., Gekiere W. & Palm W., “Free movement of services in the EU and health care” in 
Baeten R., Hervey T.K., Mossialos E. & Permanand G. (eds.), Health Systems Governance in Europe 
(CUP 2010) 461-508, 467; De Búrca G. & Craig P., EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (3
rd
 edn, 
OUP 2011) 796. 
21
 In Humbel, the Court emphasised that “the essential characteristic of remuneration lies in the fact 
that it constitutes consideration for the service in question, and is normally agreed upon between the 
Ilektra Antonaki, ‘The EU Legal Framework on Cross-Border Healthcare After the Adoption of the Patient’s 
Mobility Directive’, (2014) University of Warsaw Journal of Comparative Law 1(1), pp. 42-62. 
 
 6 
freedom to provide services, the ECJ has so far avoided characterizing the healthcare of a 
NHS in itself as “service” within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU, in an effort to maintain a 
balance between the ultimate objective of the accomplishment of the Internal Market and the 
respect of some traditionally sensitive areas of welfare States’ competences which affect the 
provision of public services with significant political and societal connotations.  
 
B. Coordination of social security 
 
Having established early enough that medical services provided for remuneration fall 
within the scope of application of the Internal Market rules on freedom to provide services, in 
1998 the Court went one step further and applied the freedom to provide services in the field 
of social security. In particular, in Kohll, the Court, responding to the objections raised by the 
Member States, held that the fact that the national rules at issue fell within the sphere of 
social security could not exclude the application of Article 56 TFEU.
22
 Whilst social security 
is a competence of the Member States, the latter must nonetheless exercise that competence 
consistently with EU law. On this basis, it ruled that the treatment provided by an 
orthodontist established in Germany was considered a “service” for the purposes of Article 
56 TFEU and that the requirement of prior authorization for the reimbursement of the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
provider and the recipient of the service”. The Court held that the national educational system did not 
fall within the scope of Article 56 TFEU because it was lacking the decisive element of remuneration. 
In this regard, the Court underlined that “the State, in establishing and maintaining such a system, is 
not seeking to engage in gainful activity but is fulfilling its duties towards its own population in the 
social, cultural and educational fields” and that “the system in question is, as a general rule, funded 
from the public purse and not by pupils or their parents” (Case 263/86 Belgian State v René Humbel 
and Marie-Thérèse Edel [1988] ECR 05365, paras 17-19). In Wirth, the Court held that “those 
considerations are equally applicable to courses given in an institute of higher education which is 
financed, essentially, out of public funds”, but conversely agreed with the UK that the establishments 
of higher education “financed essentially out of private funds, in particular by students or their 
parents, and which seek to make an economic profit” are considered “services” within the meaning of 
Article 56 TFEU (Case C-109/92 Stephan Max Wirth v Landeshauptstadt Hannover [1993] ECR I-
06447, paras 16-17). Finally, in Schwarz, the Court reiterated that private education, which is 
characterized by the element of remuneration, is an economic activity falling within the scope of 
Article 56 TFEU (Case C-76/05 Herbert Schwarz and Marga Gootjes-Schwarz v Finanzamt Bergisch 
Gladbach [2007] ECR I-06849, para 47). 
22
  Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-01931, para 21. See 
also the parallel Case C-120/95 Nicolas Decker v Caisse de maladie des employés privés [1998] ECR 
I-01831, para 25, decided on the same day as Kohll, where the Court found that the requirement of a 
prior authorization for reimbursement of the cost of a pair of spectacles with corrective lenses 
purchased from an optician established in Belgium, on a prescription from an ophthalmologist 
established in Luxembourg, constituted an unjustified restriction on the free movement of goods 
under Article 34 TFEU.  
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treatment received, imposed by Luxembourg, constituted an unjustified restriction on the 
freedom to provide services.
23
  
However, the application of the freedom to provide services does not mean that EU 
law detracts from the powers of the Member States to organise their social security systems.
24
 
Indeed, social security, one of the traditional functions of the welfare State, is a particularly 
sensitive area,
25
 which constitutes first and foremost a matter of the Member States. 
According to settled case law, “in the absence of harmonisation at Community level, it is 
therefore for the legislation of each Member State to determine, first, the conditions 
concerning the right or duty to be insured with a social security scheme and, second, the 
conditions for entitlement to benefits”.26  
Article 48 TFEU, the legal basis provision on social security, provides only for the 
coordination - and not the harmonisation - of the national legislations relating to social 
security combined with negative integration (i.e. prohibitions of discrimination). 
Coordination is one of the integration techniques used in EU secondary law, which aims at 
improving the interplay of national systems, rather than approaching the national legislations 
on the substantive level.
27
 In essence, this means that countries are entitled to establish their 
own social security system, determining who is to be insured, which benefits are granted and 
under what conditions without any interference at EU level. The EU rules on social security 
coordination do not replace national systems with a single European one. However, they do 
provide protection for EU citizens who exercise their free movement rights.  
The main legal instruments of this coordination, which is founded on the cooperation 
of national social security administrations, is Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security 
                                                        
23
 Case C-158/96 Kohll (n 22) para 54. 
24
 Case C-158/96 Kohll (n 22) para 17; Case 238/82 Duphar and Others v Netherlands [1984] ECR 
00523, para 16; Case C-70/95 Sodemare and Others v Regione Lombardia [1997] ECR I-3395, para 
27. 
25
 De la Rosa S., “The Directive on cross-border healthcare or the art of codifying complex case-law” 
(2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 15-46, 17. 
26
 Case C-158/96 Kohll (n 22) para 18; Case 110/79 Coonan v Insurance Officer [1980] ECR 1445, 
para 12; Case C-349/87 Paraschi v Landesversicherungsanstalt Württemberg [1991] ECR I-4501, 
para 15; Joined Cases C-4/95 and C-5/95 Stöber and Piosa Pereira v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1997] 
ECR I-511, para 36. 
27
 Belinger J. & Tobler C., Essential EU Law in Charts (HVG-ORAC, Budapest 2013) Chart 11/4. 
The other three integration techniques as explained in this Chart are the unified legislation, the 
harmonization and the mutual recognition. 
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systems
28
- which replaced the Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the 
application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to 
members of their families moving within the Community
29
 - and Regulation (EC) No 
987/2009 implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (hereinafter “Regulations”).30 These 
Regulations, adopted on the basis of Article 48 TFEU, fall within the framework of the 
freedom of movement for workers and their main purpose is to ensure that insured persons - 
mainly workers – do not lose their social security protection when moving to another 
Member State.
31
  
Despite the Court’s effort not to interfere with traditional social competences of the 
Member States and the recognition of the legitimate aim to maintain the financial 
sustainability of the social security and national healthcare system, it is crucial to understand 
that certain core aspects of national welfare systems are undoubtedly subjected to the free 
movement provisions.
32
 The application of the Treaty provisions on the free movement to 
publicly funded welfare services has certainly opened the way for the adoption of Directive 
2004/11/EU.  
 
                                                        
28
 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L 166/1. 
29
 Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security 
schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community [1971] OJ L 149/2. 
30
 Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 
laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of 
social security systems [2009] OJ L 284/1, which was later amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 
No 1244/2010 of 9 December 2010 amending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of social security systems and Regulation (EC) No 
987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the procedure for implementing 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 [2010] OJ L 338/35; Regulation (EU) No 465/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 amending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems and Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 laying down the procedure 
for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 [2012] OJ L 149/4 and Commission Regulation (EU) 
No 1224/2012 of 18 December 2012 amending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of social security systems and Regulation (EC) No 
987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the procedure for implementing 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 Text with relevance for the EEA and for Switzerland [2012] OJ L 
349/45. 
31
 For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the relationship between Regulations (EC) Nos 
883/2004 and 987/2009 on the coordination of social security systems and Directive 2011/24/EU on 
the application of patients' rights in cross border healthcare, see European Commission, Guidance 
note of the Commission services on the relationship between Regulations (EC) Nos 883/2004 and 
987/2009 on the coordination of social security systems and Directive 2011/24/EU on the application 
of patients' rights in cross border healthcare, AC 246/12, 21.05.2012. 
32
 De Búrca G. & Craig P. (n 20) 796. 
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III. Cross-border healthcare services under Directive 2011/24/EU 
 
The second chapter of the present article deals with the regulation of healthcare 
services under the provisions of Directive 2011/24/EU. It will first explain how the 
developments in the field of cross-border healthcare led to the adoption of this Directive (A) 
and it will then address the issues of prior authorisation and reimbursement (B). 
 
A. The adoption of Directive 2011/24/EU 
 
Before analysing the important substantive provisions regarding prior authorisation 
and reimbursement of cross-border healthcare, we will first make a brief comment on the 
exclusion of healthcare services from the Services Directive (1) and we will secondly 
examine the legal basis and the scope of Directive 2011/24/EU (2). 
 
1. The exclusion of healthcare services from the Services Directive 
 
From a historical perspective, as a result of their sensitive nature and their special 
regime, health services were excluded from the final version of the much-debated Directive 
2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (hereinafter “Directive 
2006/123/EC”).33 This Directive, known as the Bolkestein Directive after the name of the 
Commissioner who introduced the initial proposal,
34
 establishes a general legal framework 
promoting the exercise of the freedom of establishment for service providers and the free 
movement of services. Although its name is limited to services, its actual scope of application 
covers both the area of temporary cross-border provision of services and the area of 
permanent establishment of entrepreneurs or undertakings. Whilst it covers a wide range of 
service activities, which represent around 40 % of the EU’s GDP and employment, it 
nonetheless excludes from its material scope, as defined in Article 2 thereof, several 
                                                        
33
 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the internal market [2006] OJ L 376/36. 
34
 The Bolkenstein Directive received a strong opposition and was given the name “Frankenstein 
Directive”, as it was considered to be a threat to the social structures of the Member States. It is even 
argued that the strong opposition against the Services Directive influenced the public debate in 
France, a traditionally welfare state with a highly developed social protection system, and ultimately 
resulted in the negative vote in the national referendum concerning the Constitutional Treaty, see De 
Búrca G. & Craig P. (n 20) 813.  
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important types of services, among which “healthcare services whether or not they are 
provided via healthcare facilities, and regardless of the ways in which they are organised and 
financed at national level or whether they are public or private”.35 
The exclusion of healthcare services from the scope of Directive 2006/123/EC was a 
compromise between the Commission’s objective to harmonise the national legislations in 
the field of services and establishment and the Member States’ unwillingness to concede their 
competences on their welfare systems to the Union. However, despite this exclusion, the 
Court continued to consider healthcare services as “services” within the meaning of Article 
56 TFEU. Besides, according to the Tedeschi principle, in the absence of secondary 
legislation, the relevant general Treaty provisions apply.
36
 The application of the Treaty rules 
in the field of cross-border healthcare services led to important jurisprudential principles, 
which were ultimately codified in Directive 2011/24/EU.  
 
2. The legal basis and the scope of Directive 2011/24/EU 
 
Directive 2011/24/EU was adopted on the general legal basis provision of Article 114 
TFEU, which confers upon the EU the power to adopt measures, in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, for the approximation of national legislations in fields relating 
to the establishment and functioning of the Internal Market. Recital 2 of its Preamble justifies 
the choice of this legal basis provision by referring to the aim of the Directive, which is to 
improve the functioning of the internal market and the free movement of goods, persons and 
services. Even though the Directive affects also (or even primarily) issues of public health, 
Article 168 TFEU was not ultimately added as a second legal basis provision, despite the 
political pressure exercised by the Member States.   
The subject matter and scope of Directive 2011/24/EU is defined in Article 1 thereof, 
according to which the Directive aims at facilitating the access to safe and high-quality cross-
border healthcare and promoting cooperation on healthcare between the Member States, 
while clarifying that this objective will be pursued in full respect of national competences in 
organizing and delivering healthcare. With respect to its material scope, which is defined by 
the combined provisions of Article 1 and 3 (a) and (e), the Directive applies to the provision 
of cross-border healthcare, regardless of how it is organized, delivered and financed. 
                                                        
35
 Article 2 (2) (f) of Directive 2006/123/EC. 
36
 Case C-5/77 Carlo Tedeschi v Denkavit Commerciale s.r.l. [1977] ECR I-01555, para 35. 
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However, Article 1 (3) of the Directive explicitly excludes from its scope of application (a) 
services in the field of long-term care the purpose of which is to support people in need of 
assistance in carrying out routine, everyday tasks,
37
 (b) allocation of and access to organs for 
the purpose of organ transplants and (c) public vaccination programmes against infectious 
diseases which are exclusively aimed at protecting the health of the population on the 
territory of a Member State and which are subject to specific planning and implementation 
measures (with the exception of Chapter IV which refers to the cooperation between the 
Member States on the implementation of the Directive). Accordingly, the Directive at issue 
does not apply to long-term care services, organ transplants and public vaccination 
programmes.  
 
B. The rules on prior authorisation and reimbursement under Directive 2011/24/EU 
 
Turning to the more substantive questions arising under Directive 2011/24/EU, we 
will now address the issues of prior authorisation (1), reimbursement (2) and administrative 
procedures regarding cross-border healthcare (3). For this purpose, we will also compare the 
provisions of the Directive with the provisions of the social security Regulations in order to 
obtain a better understanding of this complex system.  
Before starting our analysis, it should be mentioned that Directive 2011/24/EU does 
not distinguish between planned and unplanned healthcare but applies in principle to all care 
received by patients in a Member State other than the Member State of affiliation.
38
 With 
regard to the unplanned healthcare, Article 2 (m) and 7 (1) of Directive 2011/24 provide that 
where the terms of the Regulations are met and the conditions of the Regulations are more 
favourable to the patient, the Regulations must be used, unless the patient explicitly requests 
otherwise. The application of the more favourable provisions of the Regulations is also 
enshrined in Recital 28 of the Preamble according to which the Directive “should not affect 
an insured person’s rights in respect of the assumption of costs of healthcare which becomes 
                                                        
37
 The OECD has defined long-term care as the care for people needing support in activities of daily 
living over a prolonged period of time (OECD Report: “Long-Term Care for Older People”, 2005). 
Long-term care services are usually provided to persons with physical or mental disabilities and the 
frail elderly and particular groups that need assistance in their daily life activities. They include 
rehabilitation, basic medical services, home nursing, social care, housing and services such as 
transport, meals, occupational and empowerment activities, thus also including help with instrumental 
activities of daily living (IADLs) (EU Report: “Long-term in the European Union”, April 2008). 
38
 European Commission, Guidance note (n 31) 3. 
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necessary on medical grounds during a temporary stay in another Member State according to 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004”. Consequently, Directive 2011/24/EU cannot be invoked in 
an effort to deny access to healthcare for insured persons who possess the European Health 
Insurance Card.
39
 With regard to planned healthcare, the system of prior authorisation and 
reimbursement established by the Directive constitutes to a great extent a codification of the 
case law of the Court in the relevant field and will be analysed in the following paragraphs. 
 
1. Prior authorisation for receiving cross-border healthcare 
 
Contrary to the Regulations, which prescribe prior authorisation as a necessary 
requirement for receiving planned treatment in another Member State, the requirement of 
prior authorisation is not the rule under Directive 2011/24/EU. In particular, according to 
Article 8 of the Directive, the Member State of affiliation
40
 may provide for a system of prior 
authorisation only for certain types of cross-border healthcare and only in so far as it is 
necessary and proportionate to the objective to be achieved and does not constitute a means 
of arbitrary discrimination or an unjustified obstacle to the free movement of patients. The 
specific types of cross-border healthcare that may be subject to prior authorisation are listed 
in Article 8 (2) of the Directive and are limited to healthcare which: (i) involves overnight 
hospital accommodation of the patient in question for at least one night; or (ii) requires use of 
highly specialized and cost-intensive medical infrastructure or medical equipment; or (iii) 
involves treatments presenting a particular risk for the patient or the population; or (iv) is 
provided by a healthcare provider that could give rise to serious and specific concerns 
                                                        
39
 Under Article 19 (1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, insured persons and their family members 
staying in a Member State other than the competent Member State are entitled to the benefits in kind 
which become necessary on medical grounds during their stay, taking into account the nature of the 
benefits and the expected length of the stay. The State of stay provides these benefits taking into 
account their nature and the length of the stay. The aim is that the person concerned is not compelled 
to return to his Member State to receive treatment before the expected end of his stay. These benefits 
are provided by the institution of the place of stay in accordance with the statutory conditions, 
procedures and rates applied by this institution, as if the beneficiaries were insured under this 
legislation. To benefit from these provisions, the persons concerned must submit an individual 
document detailing their rights issued by the competent institution od the Member State where the 
person is insured, known as the European Health Insurance Card (in application of Article 25 (1) of 
Regulation (EC) No 987/2009), directly to the treatment provider in the State of stay.  
40
 According to Article 3 (c) (i) of Directive 2011/24/EU, the Member State of affiliation is the 
Member State competent to grant to the insured person a prior authorisation to receive appropriate 
treatment outside the Member State of residence according to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) 
No 987/2009. 
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relating to the quality or safety of the care. By contrast, Article 20 (1) of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 provides that the insured persons and members of their family travelling to another 
Member State with the aim of receiving benefits in kind during the stay must seek an 
authorisation from the competent Member State.
41
  
With respect to the possible refusal of prior authorisation, the general rule laid down 
in Article 8 (5) of Directive 2011/24 is that prior authorisation may not, in principle, be 
refused if “the patient is entitled to the healthcare in question” in the Member State of 
affiliation and “when this healthcare cannot be provided on its territory within a time limit 
which is medically justifiable”. This rule constitutes a codification of the settled case law of 
the Court regarding the question of “undue delay”. In particular, before the adoption of 
Directive 2011/24/EU, the Court had been called, in several occasions, to interpret Article 20 
of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, replacing Article 22 of Regulation No 1408/71 - which lays 
down a duty to grant the authorisation where the treatment in question is among the benefits 
to which the patient is entitled and where he or she cannot be given such treatment within a 
time-limit which is medically justifiable - in conjunction with Article 56 TFEU on the 
freedom to provide services.  
According to the interpretation given by the Court in the cases of Smits and 
Peerbooms,
42
 Müller-Fauré and van Riet
43
 and Inizan,
44
 in order to determine whether 
treatment which is equally effective for the patient can be obtained without “undue delay” in 
the Member State of residence, the competent institution is required to have regard to all the 
circumstances of each specific case, taking due account not only of the patient’s medical 
condition at the time when authorisation is sought and, where appropriate, of the degree of 
pain or the nature of the patient’s disability which might, for example, make it impossible or 
extremely difficult for him to carry out a professional activity, but also of his medical history.  
In Müller-Fauré and van Riet, Court also pointed out that, in determining whether a 
treatment which is the same or equally effective for the patient is available without “undue 
                                                        
41
 In accordance with Article 1 (s) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, the competent Member State is 
the Member State in which the institution with which the person concerned is insured or from which 
the person is entitled to benefits is situated.  
42
 Case C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms (n 14) para 104. 
43
 Case C-385/99           -Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA 
and E.E.M. van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-
04509, para 90. 
44
 Case C-56/01 Inizan v Caisse primaire d'assurance maladie des Hauts-de-Seine [2003] ECR I-
12423, para 46. 
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delay” from an establishment on the territory of the Member State of residence, the 
competent institution cannot base its decision exclusively on the existence of waiting lists on 
that territory without taking account of the specific circumstances of the patient’s medical 
condition.
45
 The Court continued the same line of reasoning in the Watts case, holding that in 
order to be entitled to refuse the authorisation on the ground of waiting time, the competent 
institution must however establish that the waiting time, arising from objectives relating to 
the planning and management of the supply of hospital care, does not exceed the period 
which is acceptable in the light of an objective medical assessment of the clinical needs of the 
person concerned in the light of his medical condition and the history and probable course of 
his illness, the degree of pain he is in and/or the nature of his disability at the time when the 
authorisation is sought.
46
 The Court also added that “the setting of waiting times should be 
done flexibly and dynamically, so that the period initially notified to the person concerned 
may be reconsidered in the light of any deterioration in his state of health occurring after the 
first request for authorisation”.47 Consequently, in the light of this case law, it is important to 
underline the significance of an objective and case-by-case medical assessment of the 
patient’s condition in order to determine whether the time limit within which an equally 
effective treatment can be provided in his or her own Member State is reasonable and 
acceptable.  
Having established the rule that the Member State of affiliation is in principle obliged 
to grant prior authorisation if the treatment requested by the patient could not be provided on 
its territory without “undue delay”, the Directive then allows for further derogations from this 
general rule on the grounds of safety or quality considerations. In particular, according to 
Article 8 (6) of Directive 2011/24, the Member State of affiliation may refuse to grant prior 
authorisation when: (a) the patient will be exposed with reasonable certainty to a patient-
safety risk that cannot be regarded as acceptable; (b) the general public will be exposed with 
reasonable certainty to a substantial safety hazard as a result of the cross-border healthcare in 
question; (c) the healthcare is to be provided by a healthcare provider that raises serious and 
specific concerns relating to the respect of standards and guidelines on quality of care and 
patient safety.
48
 These exceptions can be reduced to the general derogation on the ground of 
                                                        
45
 Case C-385/99 Müller-Fauré and van Riet (n 43) para 92. 
46
 Case C-372/04 Watts (n 18) para 68. 
47
 Ibid para 69. 
48
 The last derogation under Article 8 (6) (d) of the Directive, according to which the Member State of 
affiliation may refuse to grant prior authorisation when the healthcare can be provided on its territory 
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public health mentioned in Article 52 TFEU in conjunction with Article 62 TFEU. Before the 
adoption of the Directive, in Stamatelaki, the Court dismissed the argument of the Greek 
government that the exclusion of reimbursement of the costs occasioned in private hospitals 
in another Member State, except those relating to treatment provided to children under 14 
years of age, were justified by the need to guarantee the quality of health services.
49
 It based 
its reasoning on the principle of mutual recognition
50
 and it ruled that private hospitals 
located in other Member States are also subject to quality controls and that doctors who 
operate in those establishments provide professional guarantees equivalent to those of doctors 
established in Greece, in particular since the adoption and implementation of Council 
Directive 93/16/EEC of 5 April 1993 to facilitate the free movement of doctors and the 
mutual recognition of their diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal 
qualifications.
51
 However, in the absence of harmonisation of quality standards in hospitals, 
the imposition of an automatic and unconditional trust of all private healthcare institutions is 
not be a “self-evident solution”.52 For instance, in the French laboratories decision, the Court 
recognised that France could require laboratories established in another Member State to 
prove that the controls of that Member State were no less strict than those applicable in 
France.
53
 Due to the wide diversity in the quality of the clinical care,
54
 Member States claim 
that strict requirements for the approval of cross-border services and frequent inspections are 
necessary for ensuring the quality assurance of healthcare services.
55
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
within a time limit which is medically justifiable stems from the general rule of Article 8 (5) of the 
Directive. 
49
 Case C-444/05 Stamatelaki (n 15) para 38. 
50
 The principle was first elaborated within the framework of the free movement of goods in the case 
120/78 Rewe Zentral AG v                                        (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 
649, para 14. 
51
 Case C-444/05 Stamatelaki (n 15) para 37. 
52
 Baeten R., Gekiere W. & Palm W., “Free movement of services in the EU and health care” in 
Baeten R., Hervey T.K., Mossialos E. & Permanand G. (eds.), Health Systems Governance in Europe 
(CUP 2010) 461-508, 484. 
53
 Case C-496/01 Commission v France (French laboratories) [2004] ECR I-2351, para 74. 
54
 Glinos I.A., Legido-Quigley H., McKee M. & Nolte E., Assuring the quality of health care in the 
European Union, WHO 2008 on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. 
55
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2. Reimbursement of the costs of cross-border healthcare 
 
With regard to the question of reimbursement of cross-border healthcare, the general 
principle set out in Article 7 of Directive 2011/24/EU prescribes that the Member State of 
affiliation shall ensure that the costs incurred by the insured person who receives cross-border 
healthcare are reimbursed. This reimbursement is conditioned upon the healthcare in question 
being among the benefits to which the insured person is entitled in the Member State of 
affiliation. In practice, this means that the patient who seeks a treatment in another Member 
State has to pay the full cost of the treatment received directly to the healthcare provider and 
subsequently, he or she may ask for reimbursement only if the treatment received is covered 
by his of her insurance in the State of affiliation.  
The fourth paragraph of Article 7 of the Directive makes an important clarification 
regarding the costs that are to be reimbursed: it provides that “the costs of cross-border 
healthcare shall be reimbursed or paid directly by the Member State of affiliation up to the 
level of costs that would have been assumed by the Member State of affiliation, had this 
healthcare been provided in its territory without exceeding the actual costs of healthcare 
received”. This means that if the treatment received in the Member State of treatment costs 
more than it would have cost in the Member State of affiliation, the latter is only obliged to 
reimburse the amount that it would have paid should the treatment had been provided on its 
territory. It furthermore means that, in a reverse situation, where the treatment received in the 
Member State of treatment costs less than it would have cost in the Member State of 
affiliation, the latter is only obliged to cover the actual costs of the treatment received. This 
limitation of the reimbursement appears to be reasonable and consistent with the need to 
prevent the risk of jeopardizing the financial balance of a social security system as an 
overriding reason in the general interest capable of justifying a barrier to the principle of 
freedom to provide services and the need to protect public health which includes the 
objective of maintaining a balanced medical and hospital service open to all.  
By contrast, in the Vanbraekel case,
56
 which was examined under the regime 
established by the Regulations and the general Article 56 TFEU, the Court reached an 
opposite conclusion and established the “Vanbraekel supplement” which was later 
incorporated in Article 26 (7) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. In particular, the Court, 
                                                        
56
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whilst recognizing that Article 22 of Regulation No 1408/71 did not have the effect of 
requiring additional reimbursement when the system applied in the Member State in which 
the person concerned was insured was more beneficial,
57
 it nonetheless held that this 
additional reimbursement was required in the light of Article 56 TFEU. The reasoning of the 
Court was that the lower level of cover when the person receives treatment in another 
Member State may deter, or even prevent, that person from resorting to providers of medical 
services established in other Member States and thus constitutes a barrier to freedom to 
provide services.
58
 This barrier cannot be justified on the ground of the overriding reason in 
the general interest of preventing the risk of seriously undermining the financial equilibrium 
of the social security system or on the ground of the protection of public health under Article 
62 TFEU in conjunction with Article 52 (1) TFEU.
59
 It follows from the foregoing that, under 
Article 56 TFEU the costs are to be assumed at the most favourable tariff and therefore the 
wording “without exceeding the actual costs of healthcare received” of Article 7 (4) of 
Directive 2011/24/EU seems to be in contradiction with the “Vanbraekel supplement”. Of 
course, under the same Article, it remains always possible for the Member State of affiliation 
to cover the full cost and may even reimburse other related costs, such as accommodation and 
travel costs, but this is a mere discretion and not an obligation.  
It should be noted that Article 7 (9) of Directive 2011/24, which codifies the relevant 
case law of the Court, provides for a derogation whereby the Member State of affiliation may 
impose restrictions on the reimbursement on the grounds of overriding reasons of general 
interest, such as planning requirements relating to the aim of ensuring sufficient and 
permanent access to a balanced range of highly-quality treatment in the Member State 
concerned or the wish to control costs and avoid, as far as possible, any waste of financial, 
technical and human resources.  
 
3. Administrative procedure regarding cross-border healthcare 
 
Finally, in accordance with Article 9 of Directive 2011/24/EU, the Member State of 
affiliation shall ensure that the administrative procedures regarding cross-border healthcare 
are based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are necessary and proportionate to 
                                                        
57
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the objective to be achieved and that the time limits are reasonable taking into account the 
medical condition of the patient and the urgency of the situation. The administrative 
procedures established by the Member States should comply not only with the requirements 
laid down in Article 9 of Directive 2011/24, but also with Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which stipulates the right to an effective judicial protection.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Although the organisation of public health policies is considered to be one of the 
traditional competences of the welfare States, the societal and financial significance of cross-
border healthcare services in the accomplishment of the Internal Market has subjected them 
to the rules on the freedom to provide services. As a result of the application of these rules, 
any directly or indirectly discriminatory measure or any restriction on the freedom to provide 
cross-border healthcare is prohibited, unless it is justified. A directly discriminatory measure 
– i.e. a measure which discriminates explicitly on the basis of nationality - can only be 
justified on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health according to Article 
52 TFEU in conjunction with Article 62 TFEU. An indirectly discriminatory measure – i.e. a 
measure, which is not based on nationality, but which in practice affects adversely foreign 
providers or recipients of healthcare services - and a restriction – i.e. any national rule which 
has the effect of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than 
the provision of services purely within one Member State and thus hinders the cross-border 
provision of healthcare services – can be justified not only on the grounds of public policy, 
public security and public health mentioned in Article 52 TFEU in conjunction with Article 
62 TFEU, but also on the grounds of overriding reasons in the general interests created by the 
case law of the Court and later codified in Directive 2011/24/EU. In cases involving cross-
border healthcare, the Member States usually invoke the need to prevent the risk of 
jeopardising the financial balance of their social security systems. The Court has accepted 
that such an overriding reason in the general interest may justify a restriction on the freedom 
to provide services if it complies with the fundamental principle of proportionality, which 
refers to the double test of suitability and necessity of the restriction in question.
60
 The 
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acceptance by the Court of the possible derogation grounds is linked to the effort to maintain 
a balance between the subjection of healthcare services to the rules of the Internal Market and 
the need to respect the exercise of the traditional competences of welfare States. Directive 
2011/24/EU tries to achieve this delicate balance by laying down liberal rules regarding the 
issues of prior authorisation and reimbursement and by allowing at the same time for 
important derogations for the Member States. Besides, according to Recital 4 of its Preamble, 
the application of the Directive should not result in patients being encouraged to receive 
treatment outside the Member State of affiliation. Finally, we cannot ignore that the system 
created by the case law of the Court and subsequently developed by Directive 2011/24/EU is 
quite complex and may lead to social inequalities, since “it is primarily the wealthier and 
better-informed European citizens who benefit from the rules”.61 It remains to be seen how 
the Member States will implement the Directive and how the Court will interpret its 
provisions.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
not justified, since the medical expenses incurred were to be reimbursed at exactly the same rates as 
those applied in Luxembourg and therefore there was no risk for the national social security system.  
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